About Conflict Risk Network

Conflict Risk Network is made up of institutional investors, financial service providers and related stakeholders calling upon corporate actors to fulfill their responsibility to respect human rights and to take steps that support peace and stability in areas affected by genocide and mass atrocities. Our goal is to increase such behavior by corporate actors and thereby reduce conflict risk.

The Network has a respected voice in the institutional investment field. It produces unparalleled research on companies operating in Sudan, makes recommendations on how corporations can fulfill their responsibility to respect human rights in areas affected by mass atrocities and genocide, and harnesses the collective weight of over U.S. $3 trillion in assets when leading focused corporate engagement.

Since 2006, Conflict Risk Network’s research and engagement have persuaded more than 12 major corporations to adopt recommendations for appropriate conduct in Sudan. Our work has been featured in thousands of news articles in outlets such as CNN, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, The New York Times, Forbes, Responsible Investor and Bloomberg.

The Network’s 100 members include pension funds, some of the world’s largest asset management firms, government entities, university endowments, foundations, financial service providers, and socially responsible investment firms.

About United to End Genocide

Conflict Risk Network is a project of United to End Genocide, the largest activist organization in America dedicated to preventing and ending genocide and mass atrocities worldwide. The United to End Genocide community includes faith leaders, students, artists, investors and genocide survivors, and all those who believe we must fulfill the promise the world made following the Holocaust – “Never Again!”
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THE SUDAN–SOUTH SUDAN AGREEMENTS:
A LONG WAY TO GO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 27, 2012, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir signed a series of agreements addressing issues that have at times this year brought the two countries to the brink of war.

The agreements are the culmination of months of talks and create a demilitarized zone along the border, allow for oil production to resume and open the border up to trade. Despite progress made by both sides, this is far from the comprehensive peace agreement that is needed.

Yet, there is no doubt that these agreements are significant. An agreement on security issues, specifically the demilitarized zone, was a prerequisite for the signing of the provisional oil agreement reached in August. The resumption of oil production in South Sudan, shut down since January 2012 as a result of a dispute over oil fees, is vital to the economic survival of both countries.

In the past, Sudan and South Sudan have signed any number of agreements that failed to be implemented, usually as a result of Sudan ignoring or refusing to abide by them. Much can happen to derail the process in the months it will take to restart production; nevertheless, it is a step back from the brink of conflict between the two countries. Once serious levels of production and exports resume, the international pressure to keep the oil pumping should prevent both sides from threatening to turn off the spigots.

Nevertheless, this is not yet the dawn of a new day in Sudan/South Sudan relations. The agreements not only failed to address the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states but failed to achieve consensus on border demarcation or ownership of the contested Abyei region. In fact, as the agreements were being signed in Addis Ababa, Sudan was bombing South Kordofan state. With such violence continuing and critical issues still left unresolved, this deal shows limited progress that is mainly motivated by economic self-interest.

That is why it is critical that the United States:

- Lead the UN Security Council in demanding full and unimpeded access for international humanitarian organizations to South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur, and immediate preparation of alternative means of distributing emergency assistance to civilians wherever denial of aid is being used as a weapon of war;
- Lead the UN Security Council in demanding that the government of Sudan immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and over South Kordofan and Blue Nile and encourage that further action be taken in the event that Sudan fails to comply with the terms of the AU Roadmap and UNSC Resolution 2046;
- Lead the UN Security Council in calling for a peacekeeping force for South Kordofan and Blue Nile that contains a human rights monitoring component, and the appropriate resources and mandate necessary to protect civilians;
- Lead the UN Security Council in pushing to expand the existing United Nations arms embargo for Darfur to all of Sudan;
- Strengthen and expand U.S. sanctions and lead the UN Security Council in demanding strengthened and expanded sanctions against those responsible for violence in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei; and
- Lead the UN Security Council in urging an independent international investigation into crimes committed against civilians in Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, preferably through the International Criminal Court.
BACKGROUND ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN RELATIONS

From 1983-2005, Sudan’s North and South fought a brutal civil war which led to the deaths of an estimated two million Southerners and displaced an additional four million civilians. In 2005, the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending the war. The CPA provided for a referendum on southern secession. The referendum took place on January 9, 2011, and the result was a landslide vote for secession, with nearly 100% of voters in the South voting in favor of separation.

Six months later, on July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan officially became the world’s newest nation. Prior to independence, oil revenue provided the government of Sudan and the regional government of South Sudan with 63% and 98% of their revenue, respectively. With an estimated 75% of that oil located in South Sudan, Sudan potentially stood to lose U.S. between $7.77—$10.4 billion without some sort of agreement on a transitional financial assistance package and oil transit fees.

Although landlocked South Sudan took with it the majority of Sudan’s oil, it still requires the use of pipelines running through Sudan to reach Port Sudan for export. An agreement on the fees for South Sudan’s use of those pipelines was not reached before independence, but oil initially continued to flow during negotiations. These negotiations extended beyond oil to a host of other unresolved issues—including border demarcation, citizenship, security, and the contested Abyei region—and grew increasingly contentious during late 2011.

SOUTH SUDAN OIL SHUTDOWN

On January 20, 2012, the government of South Sudan in Juba made the drastic decision to shut down all oil production indefinitely. Juba said this extreme measure was in response to Sudan’s allegedly illegal confiscation of more than six million barrels of southern oil, valued at over $800 million. The government of Sudan in Khartoum denied that it stole oil from South Sudan. It claimed the oil was confiscated to offset unpaid fees.

Negotiations continued during the shutdown and a summit between the two heads of state was scheduled for April 3. However, before the meeting, Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir canceled the summit and cut off talks when fighting broke out around the Heglig oil field at the end of March. Both North and South made statements refusing to allow South Sudanese oil to be transported through Sudanese pipelines ever again, placing stress on both nations. For the North, the challenge is finding alternative means of revenue and for the South finding a means of transport.

Despite resistance from both of the Sudans, the African Union (AU) made strong demands for the countries to return to the negotiating table. Both the AU and the United Nations (UN) issued resolutions demanding significant progress by August 2, 2012.

FIGHTING OVER HEGLIG

Tensions escalated dramatically at the end of March when the worst fighting between the two countries since the South’s independence in July 2011 erupted. South Sudan’s military, the SPLA, attacked the oil-producing region of Heglig, situated on the contentious North-South border in Sudan’s South Kordofan state. SPLA claimed to be responding to a Sudanese attack on South Sudan’s Unity State and a bombing campaign of southern oil fields. On April 10, 2012, the SPLA seized control of Heglig, a move which was condemned by the international community. Sudan called the move an act of war and mounted an offensive to retake the area. SPLA forces withdrew from Heglig on April 20. South Sudan claimed that it withdrew voluntarily to avoid all-out war, while Sudan claimed the counterattack by its armed forces drove the South out. Despite South Sudan’s retreat from Heglig, Sudan has
continued to bomb border areas and there have been claims of Sudanese troops crossing the border.\(^8\)

While there had been ongoing negotiations over several of the disputed areas on the border, Heglig had not previously been a major point of contention. In 2009, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that Heglig was not a part of Abyei and instead belonged to the North, despite the South’s claim that it culturally belongs with them.\(^9\)

Prior to the fighting, the oil fields in Heglig—operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) consortium led by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)—accounted for almost half of Sudan’s oil production.\(^10\) While in control of the field South Sudan shut down oil production and the fighting reportedly resulted in significant damage to oil facilities. The loss, even temporarily, of 70,000 barrels of oil per day was a significant blow to Sudan’s economy—which was already reeling from the loss of the oil-rich South.\(^11\)

**LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT**

South Sudan’s shutdown of oil production was a bold move with significant risks given both countries’ dependence on oil revenues. In order to cope with the loss, the government of South Sudan intended to cut non-salary government spending by 50%.\(^12\) However, according to a scathing leaked World Bank report from March 2012, even if South Sudan decreased its monthly spending by 77%, its reserves would only last until December 2013 without the resumption of oil production.\(^13\) In the report, a World Bank official noted that even if South Sudan managed to triple non-oil revenue it would have only a “negligible” impact on the economy. The months without production have reportedly left South Sudan running low on foreign-exchange reserves, weakening the South Sudanese pound, which drives up the cost of imports and puts further strain on the economy.\(^14\) It is predicted that the poverty level in South Sudan will jump from 51% to 83% in 2013.\(^15\)

South Sudan isn’t alone in facing severe economic challenges, including rampant inflation and skyrocketing food and fuel prices.\(^16\) This year Sudan put an emphasis on increasing its gold production in an effort to lessen its dependence on oil revenue. However, even with the opening of its first gold refinery in September, the economic damage from the shutdown has been severe, and Sudan is not going to be capable of filling that gap with gold revenues.\(^17\)

A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission to Sudan found a 2.7% slump in its economic growth, a 4% deficit in the GDP in 2011, and projected 19% inflation by the end of 2012.\(^18\) In June, as part of austerity measures to help compensate for lost oil revenues, the Sudanese government announced plans for the gradual removal of fuel subsidies along with an increase in taxes and customs duties on luxury products. The announcement provoked public protests in Khartoum, Omdurman, and other cities.\(^19\) At times the protests have been met with violent response by the government, including the deaths of eight protesters who were shot by police in Nyala, Darfur, in August and the reported arrest of thousands.\(^20\)

**AU AND UN RESOLUTIONS**

On May 2, 2012, the UN Security Council adopted UN Resolution 2046 in response to heightened tensions between Sudan and South Sudan. The resolution laid out a roadmap for negotiations and threatened...
additional measures such as sanctions if the Sudans failed to make substantial progress on the outstanding issues by the resolution’s August 2 deadline.

Both countries offered proposals and counter proposals to resolve the oil impasse. South Sudan was clear that it simply wanted to pay transit fees for use of the North’s pipeline. However, Sudan wanted a deal that would maintain its income at a level similar to the pre-independence 50-50 revenue sharing agreement. South Sudan’s initial offer was less than $1 per barrel; Sudan’s demand was $36. The two sides seemed stuck at these numbers since independence. Adding further complications, Sudan said it would not consider an oil transit fee proposal from South Sudan until security issues were settled.

There seemed to be little real progress toward a deal in the lead-up to the August 2 deadline until July 22, when South Sudan proposed The Agreement on Friendly Relations and Cooperation (AFRC) between The Republic of South Sudan and The Republic of Sudan. The proposal attempted to address all outstanding issues between the two sides. It also offered $7.26 and $9.10 per barrel transit fees for use of the main Petrodar and GNPOC pipelines to transport Dar Blend and Nile Blend crude, respectively, and $8 billion in transitional financial assistance. Sudan rejected the deal while lowering its demand to $32 per barrel. Despite the rejection, the proposal was the first indication of real movement by either side since a failed effort to sign an interim oil deal in January shortly after the shutdown.21

The oil shutdown, coupled with the acrimonious history between Sudan and South Sudan, prompted the signing of a non-aggression and cooperation memorandum of understanding in February 2012.22 However, the pact did nothing to stop the fighting, exemplified by the Heglig conflict and the government of Sudan’s continued bombardment of border areas. Both sides have long accused each other of recruiting and funding armed militias to attack within each other’s territory.23 Sudan continues to block aid from reaching civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, claiming that the assistance would be used to fortify rebel groups.24 Earlier this year U.S. officials warned that Sudan’s blockade on aid could help create near-famine conditions.25 On August 5, the Sudanese government and the rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement—North (SPLM-N) each signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile as part of an agreement brokered by the UN, AU and League of Arab States. Despite the MOU, as of early October, humanitarian assessments have not begun and aid has yet to enter SPLM-N controlled areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Since May 2011, violence has escalated in contentious regions in Sudan along its border with the South. The government of Sudan has utilized its military forces to displace over 100,000 people in Abyei and launch attacks in civilian areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, as detailed in United to End Genocide’s report, Sudan’s Man-Made Catastrophe: A War on Civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. There are widespread reports from South Kordofan that churches and schools have been targeted. There are further reports that civilians have been arrested and even executed on the basis of their ethnic and political identity.26

The Sudanese army has also bombed refugee areas in South Sudan where civilians from Blue Nile and South Kordofan fled to avoid government attacks.27 The UN estimates that more than 655,000 people have been internally displaced or severely affected since the fighting began in South Kordofan and Blue Nile,28 with 174,500 fleeing to South Sudan and 38,600 to Ethiopia.29 Attacks on civilians disrupted the crucial cultivation season, and currently 200,000-250,000 civilians are facing crisis to emergency levels of food insecurity in South Kordofan alone.30

**NEGOTIATIONS**

The August 2 deadline came and went. However, just two days later, on August 4, African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) officials announced that Sudan and South Sudan had reached a provisional agreement on oil pipeline fees, potentially paving the way for the resumption of oil production.
Pressure from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who visited Juba the day before the deal, and pressure from China are believed to have been large factors in reaching this agreement.31

While this deal was a significant step, it was still just an agreement to agree. The signing of the oil agreement was made contingent on a deal being reached to address the other outstanding issues, especially security. Talks resumed in Addis Ababa at the end of Ramadan in late August, but they were postponed until the beginning of September as a result of the death of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Both sides were under pressure by the UN to show significant progress by September 22, when the African Union was scheduled to meet to hear the final report on the status of the talks from AUHIP. The deadline was informally extended as weeks of negotiations culminated in a one-day summit between Bashir and Kiir, which turned into four days of intense negotiations. Nine agreements addressing a range of issues including security and oil were signed on Thursday, September 27.32

**KEY TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS**

**Security**

Resolution of security issues was emphasized by Sudan as a necessary pre-condition for the signing of the oil agreement. Khartoum has accused Juba of supporting rebel groups, especially the SPLM-N, operating in Sudan. Juba has accused Khartoum of supporting rebels, including in Jonglei state. The new deal commits both countries to the “cessation of harbouring of, or support to rebel groups against the other state.”33

The deal also provides for the creation of the demilitarized border zone that was agreed upon in principle in June 2011, but it was not implemented as a result of disagreement over where the border actually lies. While Juba agreed to the zone proposed by the AUHIP, Khartoum feared that accepting the map would make it a “recognized document” that could be used against Sudan later in border negotiations.34 Of the five disputed border regions the focal point of contention was Mile 14.35 Located between Western Bahr El-Ghazal and East Darfur states, the area of grazing land has long been claimed by Sudan.36

The 10 kilometer-wide demilitarized zone will run along the length of the 1800 km border.37 South Sudan will have to pull its forces from five areas currently under its control including Mile 14. UN and the UN peacekeepers in Abyei will verify the withdrawal,38 and the zone will be monitored by a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission made up of representatives from Sudan and South Sudan.
and independent monitors. The agreement clearly states that this zone does not demarcate the borders.

A remaining concern is the SPLM-N, which claims to control over 40% of the North-South border in Blue Nile state and the Nuba Mountains. They have suggested that creating any demilitarized zone without Sudan agreeing to a ceasefire would be difficult. SPLM-N has offered a ceasefire but its terms require humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

**Border Demarcation**

At least 20% of the border has yet to be demarcated with major disagreements on at least five contentious areas across the border. A Technical Border Committee was established soon after the signing of the CPA. However, the Committee has been ineffective, and has yet to resolve any of the outstanding border disputes.

In past negotiations South Sudan has pushed for arbitration, which would avoid the political repercussions of either country being seen as handing over border areas and their populations to the other. Given the pressures put on the negotiating teams by tribes in the Mile 14 area and hardliners on both sides of the border, handing the decision-making over to arbitration is understandably tempting.

The downside to arbitration is that it would separate the border demarcation process from negotiations on the other remaining issues. As other outstanding issues are settled further bargaining chips are removed, restricting the options for the give-and-take necessary to reach a deal on the contested areas.

In conjunction with the border deals North and South signed agreements committing to the resumption of cross-border trade and guaranteeing the “four freedoms,” allowing citizens of both countries to own property, work, reside and move to the other country. Sudan suspended bilateral trade with South Sudan in March and its return, which is already beginning, will allow for South Sudan to import food from Sudan and allow pastoralists and migrant workers to cross the border. Such cross-border trade is expected to provide a substantial boost to both economies.

**Abyei**

Adjacent to the oil-rich town of Heglig, Abyei has political and economic significance for the North and South. Both countries have tried to claim it as part of the CPA. A referendum on whether the region would stay with the North or go to the South, in the case of secession, was scheduled to be held alongside the South’s referendum on independence in January 2011. Following disagreements about whether the nomadic Arab Misseriya tribe should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite, the vote was not held.

In May 2011, Sudan seized Abyei, displacing 110,000 civilians. The entire Ngok Dinka population fled to South Sudan. One month later, Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement to withdraw all armed troops from Abyei and bring in the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

In May 2012—11 months after the agreement—South Sudan completely removed its troops from Abyei.
Sudan did not completely remove its military forces from the region until May 29, the day negotiations resumed between the Khartoum and Juba. However, armed police forces from Sudan remain in the region in violation of the agreement. In advance of the resumption of talks, South Sudan accused Sudan of keeping those forces in the region to provoke a return to hostilities. Only an estimated 10,000 of the Ngok Dinka who fled from Abyei in May 2011 have returned. The other 100,000 remain displaced.

During negotiations Sudan rejected an AUHIP proposal that South Sudan had accepted, which would have allowed for the Abyei region to hold its referendum on October 13. Since both sides agree that Abyei’s status should be decided by referendum, the recent negotiations are focused on who is eligible to vote.

Khartoum’s resistance to a resolution on Abyei stems from a number of considerations, most notably the potential costs to the regime of being perceived as giving up even more territory after already allowing South Sudan to secede. The loss of Abyei would also hurt the National Congress Party with the nomadic Misseriya people, who are an important source of political support for the ruling party. The Misseriya are a potential risk to peace even if Khartoum and Juba reach an agreement. In the past they have threatened to respond with violence if they are excluded from voting in any referendum on Abyei. Any agreement between Sudan and South Sudan will need to include protections for the Misseriya, especially grazing rights.

THE OIL DEAL

Transit Fees

The Agreement on Oil establishes transit fees of $9.48 and $11 per barrel for the Petrodar and GNPOC pipelines as well as $3 billion in transitional financial assistance for Sudan to make up for the loss of revenue as the result of South Sudan’s secession. The agreement will last for 3.5 years at which point the transit fees can be renegotiated, but not increased.

In an effort to sever its dependence on Sudan, South Sudan has spoken of working with Kenya and Ethiopia to construct a pipeline to transport oil. The concept, which has been discussed for years, would involve exporting South Sudan’s oil through Kenya to the port of Lamu. The 3.5 year term for the transit fee agreement appears to be the result of the belief on the part of South Sudan that it can have the new pipeline completed in this timeframe. However, with bids on the project having just been submitted, this seems an extremely optimistic estimation both logistically and financially. There is also concern about the possibility of a return to conflict if Sudan is not assured of a portion of the revenue from South Sudan’s oil following completion of this pipeline.

What the agreement fails to include is public accountability. Its transparency article only requires North and South to share production and payment information with each other, not to disclose it to the public. The lack of disclosure will mean a lack of public accountability. This is a significant problem given that in 2006 a former Sudanese finance minister estimated that more than 70% of Sudan’s oil revenue was funneled to Sudan’s military, which has been connected directly to the civil war that cost two million lives, the ongoing conflict in Sudan’s western Darfur region, and the recent fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

Transitional Financial Assistance

The IMF estimated that Sudan faces a fiscal gap of $7.77 billion as a result of South Sudan’s independence. Sudan itself claims $10.4 billion. The leading proposal for addressing this gap was a plan in which one-third would be filled by South Sudan, Sudan would save one-third through austerity measures, and the final third would come from international donors through debt forgiveness, grants and the removal of sanctions. This was the proposal that was ultimately
incorporated into the agreement. South Sudan has agreed to pay $3.028 billion to Sudan over the 3.5 year term of the deal.

As part of the CPA, the United States committed to lifting sanctions if Sudan allowed the referendum on the South’s independence. Sudan’s attacks on South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei along with the ongoing violence in Darfur have forced the U.S. to delay this change in policy. However, while those sanctions mean the U.S. cannot contribute directly to reduce the gap, it has been reported that the U.S. will encourage other donors—especially China and the gulf countries. Human rights groups have expressed concern over the possibility these contributions could provide support to Sudan’s military.

In addition to the budget deficit, Sudan’s debt is predicted to reach an all-time high of $45.7 billion in 2013. This number represents 83% of Sudan’s 2011 GDP. Sudan retained the entirety of the national debt when South Sudan seceded in 2011. The Agreement on Certain Economic Matters signed in September commits South Sudan to helping Sudan obtain debt relief from international creditors. Offers of debt relief are expected from a number of countries including Germany, the UK and the U.S., but the process is likely to be slow and tied to political conditions. If comprehensive relief cannot be obtained the agreement will require the two countries to share the debt.

**Arrears Forgiveness**

In addition to the cash transfer, the proposed agreement includes South Sudan forgiving arrears and outstanding debts owed by Sudan. Officials in Juba claim this will amount to almost $5.5 billion, representing half a billion dollars in commercial arrears owed to South Sudan dating back to independence and $4.97 billion in pardoned debt relief also owed by Sudan. According to South Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar—combined with the transitional financial assistance and oil transit fees—this is the equivalent of $40 per barrel of oil and would make South Sudan, “the biggest donor on earth to a single country, Sudan.”

Also at issue is the U.S. $815 million in oil from four oil shipments South Sudan accused Sudan of stealing in January, precipitating the oil shutdown. Khartoum claimed the oil was taken to cover unpaid transit fees. The agreement requires South Sudan to be repaid for two of the cargoes, one of which has been anchored off Singapore since February and the other of which was sold with the U.S. $75 million payment held in escrow. Ownership of the other two shipments isn’t directly addressed. However, the terms of the deal require each party to agree to “unconditionally and irrevocably cancel and forgive any claims of oil-related arrears.” The issue of who is responsible for the significant fees that accrued while ownership of the cargoes was in dispute appears yet to be resolved.
NEXT STEPS

Implementation of the agreements has already begun. The Oil Agreement has been approved by the parliaments of both countries and on October 18, the government of South Sudan ordered oil companies to restart production.63

Despite aggressive predictions of when oil operations might resume in the heady aftermath of the oil deal, production and export of Dar Blend crude by Petrodar isn’t expected to begin until at least December 2012 and export of Nile Blend crude by GNPOC is not expected until June 2013 due to serious damage to the pipeline during the April fighting.64

Both pipelines—filled with water to prevent damage during the shutdown—will have to be flushed and refilled with oil. The equipment that was damaged after being improperly shut down will have to be repaired or replaced, and oil companies will have to re-hire and return staff. Petrodar’s general manager of production said that even if the contracts and orders are prepared quickly it will take a month to “warm up the pipes” and three months to “approach the production plateau.”65

In addition to the technical hurdles, other obstacles remain that could derail the deal or delay the resumption of oil production and export. It is not uncommon for deals between Sudan and South Sudan to fall apart at the last moment or be ignored, usually by Sudan, once they have been signed. The September 27 deals do not signal any fundamental reapproachment between Sudan and South Sudan. Antagonism between the two countries is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Both sides are also experiencing some strong opposition to the agreements domestically, including rumors of a possible coup attempt against President Kiir in South Sudan.66

Ultimately, the deal was largely made possible by mutual and immediate self-interest for oil production to resume. Neither side can well afford a repeat of the economically disastrous shutdown tactic. It is hoped that the significant internal and external pressure to keep the oil flowing will further help to support continued production.

However, final decisions on border demarcation and resolution of Abyei’s future were punted down the road, and even as the deals were being signed in Addis Ababa, Sudan was bombing South Kordofan.67 As long as those issues remain unresolved and Sudan’s brutal counterinsurgency in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states continues, there is still a long way to go to resolve all the issues between the two countries and achieve a lasting peace.
International pressure will remain critical in continuing to work towards a final resolution of the remaining issues. To that end United to End Genocide urges the following steps:

To the United States:

• Lead the UN Security Council in demanding full and unimpeded access for international humanitarian organizations to South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur, and immediate preparation of alternative means of distributing emergency assistance to civilians wherever denial of aid is being used as a weapon of war;

• Lead the UN Security Council in demanding that the government of Sudan immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and over South Kordofan and Blue Nile and encourage that further action be taken in the event that Sudan fails to comply with the terms of the AU Roadmap and UNSC Resolution 2046;

• Lead the UN Security Council in calling for a peacekeeping force for South Kordofan and Blue Nile that contains a human rights monitoring component, and the appropriate resources and mandate necessary to protect civilians;

• Lead the UN Security Council in pushing to expand the existing United Nations arms embargo for Darfur to all of Sudan;

• Strengthen and expand U.S. sanctions and lead the UN Security Council in demanding strengthened and expanded sanctions against those responsible for violence in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei; and

• Lead the UN Security Council in urging an independent international investigation into crimes committed against civilians in Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, preferably through the International Criminal Court.

To the United Nations:

• Demand full and unimpeded access for international humanitarian organizations to South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur, and immediate preparation of alternative means of distributing emergency assistance to civilians wherever denial of aid is being used as a weapon of war;

• Demand that the government of Sudan immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in South Kordofan and Blue Nile;

• Authorize a peacekeeping force for South Kordofan and Blue Nile that contains a human rights monitoring component along with the appropriate resources and mandate necessary to protect civilians;

• Put in place measures to ensure accountability and impose consequences on Sudan and South Sudan should they violate the agreement;

• Expand the existing United Nations arms embargo for Darfur to all of Sudan; and

• Strengthen and expand sanctions against those responsible for violence in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei.
ENDNOTES


31 Colum Lynch, “China brokers tentative oil agreement between the Sudans,” Foreign Policy, August 14, 2012, at http://turtlebay.foreign-policy.com/posts/2012/08/14/china_brokers_tentative_oil_agreement_between_the_sudans.


33 “Agreement on Security Arrangements between The Republic of the Sudan and The Republic of South Sudan,” Addis Ababa, September 27,


61 Jared Ferrie, “South Sudan to Receive Payment From Sudan for Disputed Crude” Bloomberg, September 28, 2012 (copy retained by CRN).


